Bug 9067

from the moderator queue on the mailing list, 

Subject:
NetBSD LOCAL_CREDS fails when no supplementary groups
From:
Todd Allan <todd_allan@picovex.com>
Date:
Fri, 17 Nov 2006 13:30:00 -0800
To:
dbus@lists.freedesktop.org

Hello, I've run into a snag sending D-Bus messages on a recent NetBSD-current 
in single-user mode.  The check that fails is:

dbus-sysdeps-unix.c: _dbus_read_credentials_unix_socket():

  if (cmsg.hdr.cmsg_len < sizeof (cmsg) || cmsg.hdr.cmsg_type != SCM_CREDS)
    {
      dbus_set_error (error, DBUS_ERROR_FAILED,
                      "Message from recvmsg() was not SCM_CREDS");

In NetBSD's case, at least, struct sockcred contains a variable-length array 
of "supplemental groups", that may contain zero entries:

    int     sc_ngroups;     /* number of supplemental groups */
    gid_t   sc_groups[1];   /* variable length */

The struct sockcred transmitted with the control message will contain as many 
sc_groups entries as specified by sc_ngroups.  If sc_ngroups == 0, 
cmsg.hdr.cmsg_len will include zero sc_groups entries, and will be 4 bytes 
smaller than the sizeof(cmsg), which includes a single entry.

Processes spawned from the init process context, which has zero supplemental 
groups in its kauth_cred_t, and which do not have an ancestor that performs a 
setgroups(2), as does login(1), hit this case.

I'm new to this area and am not sure if NetBSD's behavior is unconventional 
and should perhaps be changed (say, pad out a dummy sc_groups entry), or 
whether it is reasonable to modify D-Bus to handle this case.  NetBSD provides 
a SOCKCREDSIZE() macro that could help check the received size against the 
sc_ngroups field, but I haven't looked into the portability across all 
platforms with LOCAL_CREDS or CMSGCRED.

Any advice on how to proceed appreciated, thanks,

TAllan