From 91eb2ea3362630190e08c1c777c47bae065ac828 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2015 20:09:56 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] CVE-2015-0245: prevent forged ActivationFailure from
 non-root processes

Without either this rule or better checking in dbus-daemon, non-systemd
processes can make dbus-daemon think systemd failed to activate a system
service, resulting in an error reply back to the requester.

This is redundant with the fix in the C code (which I consider to be
the real solution), but is likely to be easier to backport.
---
 bus/system.conf.in | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/bus/system.conf.in b/bus/system.conf.in
index 92f4cc4..851b9e6 100644
--- a/bus/system.conf.in
+++ b/bus/system.conf.in
@@ -68,6 +68,14 @@
     <deny send_destination="org.freedesktop.DBus"
           send_interface="org.freedesktop.DBus"
           send_member="UpdateActivationEnvironment"/>
+    <deny send_destination="org.freedesktop.DBus"
+          send_interface="org.freedesktop.systemd1.Activator"/>
+  </policy>
+
+  <!-- Only systemd, which runs as root, may report activation failures. -->
+  <policy user="root">
+    <allow send_destination="org.freedesktop.DBus"
+           send_interface="org.freedesktop.systemd1.Activator"/>
   </policy>
 
   <!-- Config files are placed here that among other things, punch 
-- 
2.1.4